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Break fees — issues for corporate lawyers
by Jerry Walter and Helen Shilling
Until recently, the payment of break fees 
(also known as termination, inducement 
or broken-deal fees) was uncommon on 
UK transactions, although they have 
featured in US takeovers for a long period. 
However, they are becoming more popular 
and have featured in a number of major 
transactions, including the BP/Amoco 
merger. Successful implementation of 
break-fee arrangements gives rise to a 
number of UK corporate law and 
regulatory issues, and market practice in 
this area is developing.
CODE APPLIES
The Takeover Code applies where 
the target company is a UK pic. The 
Takeover Panel, which oversees 
regulation of takeovers in the UK, 
will act to ensure that the target's 
shareholders are not adversely 
affected by break fee arrangements, 
since these will necessarily reduce 
offeree shareholders' funds.
Under a typical break-fee 
arrangement, one party to a takeover 
(usually the target but sometimes a major 
shareholder in the target) will agree at the 
outset of the transaction to pay a fee if 
the transaction does not proceed. 
Circumstances in which this type of 
arrangement will take effect include the 
following:
(1) the target board withdraws its 
recommendation for a transaction;
(2) the target board recommends aN ' o
proposal by a third party;
(3) the acquisition proposal lapses 
because of
(a) a merger reference;
(b) unsatisfactory due diligence;
(c) the target board takes 
prohibited steps (e.g. negotiates 
with a competing bidder).
The commercial rationale for payment 
of break fees has been questioned but 
they can provide certainty for a target 
company by tying in the offerer to the
sale process and, from the offerer's point 
of view, provide a degree of comfort and 
help to minimise the risk of being outbid 
by a third party. They can also provide 
assurance of payment of the very large 
professional fees, advisory costs and 
management time which can be involved 
in takeovers and mergers.
LEGAL ISSUES
The effect of paying a break fee is to 
move the risk of failure of the bid from 
the offerer to the target and ultimately
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the target's shareholders. It can also be 
argued that payment of such fees may not 
be commercially necessary since a bona 
fide bidder will proceed with the 
transaction if it is in its commercial 
interests to do so. Where a rival bid is 
successful, the successful bidder may seek 
to challenge payment of any break fee or 
attempt to make the directors of the 
target company who agree to the 
arrangement personally liable. These 
risks mean that careful structuring of 
break fees is required and a number of 
legal issues arise.
Directors' duties
In deciding whether to pay a break fee, 
the target's directors must balance the 
interest of the company in ensuring that 
the offer proceeds against the possible 
deterrent effect of the fee arrangement 
on the making of rival offers and the cost
o
to the company if a break fee has to be 
paid. To carry out their duty to exercise 
their judgment in an informed and 
independent fashion, and to act in the 
company's best interests, directors must 
be particularly careful to ensure that they 
are not acting for a collateral purpose, for 
example, treating the break fee as a 
means of discouraging an unwelcome,o o '
competing bidder   which would be a 
misuse of the board's powers. The 
directors should also ensure that the fee 
is reasonable and the lowest that the 
directors can negotiate in the
O
circumstances. In the situation where 
there is more than one offer outstanding, 
the company must consider the interests
of the current shareholders and 
recommend the offer which provides 
them with the best price for their shares.
The directors must also ensure that 
they do not fetter their discretion in 
advising shareholders as to the merits of
o
any potential competing offer. This will 
largely be a matter of the size of the fee in 
question. It is thought unlikely that a 
court would hold a break fee of less than 
1 per cent of the target's net assets to be 
large enough to restrict the directors' 
ability properly to advise.
Financial assistance
The Companies Act 1985 ('CA 85') 
prevents a company or any of its 
subsidiaries from giving financial 
assistance directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of helping another person to 
acquire its shares (s. 151   158). A 
'whitewash' procedure is available under 
wrhich private companies can give 
financial assistance, but this is not 
available to pics. Breach of the 
prohibition is a criminal offence on the 
part of directors, and financial assistance 
will render an agreement unenforceable.
COMMERCIAL RATIONALE
The commercial rationale for payment 
of break fees has been questioned but 
they can provide certainty' for a target 
company by tying in the offeror to the 
sale process and, from the offerer's 
point of view, provide a degree of 
comfort and help to minimise the risk 
of being outbid by a third party. They 
can also provide assurance of payment 
of the very large professional fees, 
advisory costs and management time 
which can be involved in takeovers and 
mergers.
The first issue in relation to break fees 
is whether the financial assistance 
provisions are relevant at all, given that 
payment of the fee will normally take 
place in circumstances where an offer has 
failed and no acquisition of shares has
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taken place. Although the point is 
untested in the courts the arrangement 
should be assessed at the time when the 
potential financial assistance is given, i.e. 
when the arrangement is entered into, as 
there might be judged to be financial 
assistance even where the attempted 
acquisition has failed.
In addition to the whitewash 
procedure for private companies, there 
are a number of exemptions from the 
prohibition on the giving of financial 
assistance. These include cases where the 
company's principal purpose in giving 
the assistance is not to give it for the 
purpose of the acquisition, but is an 
incidental part of some larger purpose 
and is given in good faith in the interests 
of the company (s. 153(l)(a), CA 85). 
However, the courts have held that this 
exemption only applies where there is a 
corporate act on the part of the company 
giving the financial assistance and the 
target's role in the transaction may well 
be passive.
The types of financial assistance likely 
to be relevant to break fee arrangements 
are financial assistance by way of gift, 
financial assistance given by way of 
guarantee, security or indemnity and 
other types of financial assistance given 
by a company which either has no net 
assets or which, as a result, has its net 
assets reduced to a material extent 
(s. 152(1), CA 85).
It would be unusual for break fees to 
be paid by way of gift. They will often be 
expressed to be paid by the target in 
consideration of the offerer incurring 
costs by proceeding with the bid   and in 
these circumstances no question of a gift 
arises. However, if the sum which the 
target agrees to pay the offeror is 
calculated by reference to the costs 
incurred by the offeror in making the 
offer, it will be classified as an indemnity. 
One way of avoiding this is for the parties 
to agree at the outset a pre-determined 
fixed fee, which is negotiated7 o
independently of any expectation as to 
the offerer's costs and which is not then 
adjusted by reference to the costs 
incurred by the offeror. This should allow 
the transaction to be classified as an 
inducement for the offeror to take 
forward the opportunity of making the 
offer rather than as an indemnity given bv
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the target. (In this context a distinction 
can be drawn between large trade
o
purchases and MBO-type situations,
which arise on 'public to private' 
transactions where listed companies are 
taken private by means of a management 
buy-out. In the latter situation the 
directors may be unwilling and unable to 
fund the bid without the promise of a 
break fee. However, although a break fee 
may induce a large buyer to make an offer 
it arguably may not financially assist the 
buyer that is likely to have greater 
financial resources available.)
The final issue is financial assistance of 
any other type which materially reduces 
the company's net assets. Attention in 
this area has focused on the definition of 
'net assets' and what constitutes the 
threshold of materiality for these 
purposes. Prevailing opinion is that net 
assets should be assessed as the market 
value of the target's total net assets 
including goodwill. calculated by
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reference to the offer price (in effect the 
target's actual net assets as opposed to 
their book value as shown in the 
accounts). There is some divergence of 
views as to what is 'material' for these 
purposes. Currently the safe view is taken 
to mean anything up to 1 per cent of the 
market value of the target's net assets, 
with many fees falling in the 0.5 to 0.75 
per cent range. (Since break fees have 
been payable on some extremely large 
transactions there is also thought to be a 
risk that a particularly large sum could be 
deemed by the courts to result in a 
'material' reduction, even though in fact 
it amounts to less than 1 per cent of the 
target's net assets. Although the point is 
untested, this means that regard may 
need to be given to the absolute figure 
agreed.)
Takeover Code
The Takeover Code applies where the 
target company is a UK pic. The Takeover 
Panel, which oversees regulation of 
takeovers in the UK, will act to ensure 
that the target's shareholders are not 
adversely affected by break fee 
arrangements, since these will necessarily 
reduce offeree shareholders' funds. 
There is also a concern that, where the 
target's board has received an approach 
from another party, a bona fide offer may 
be frustrated by the arrangements. The 
panel has introduced two safeguards:
  a requirement that any break fee be 'de 
minimis', which will normally mean no 
more than 1 per cent of the offer value 
  an amount similar to the figure for
judging the 'materiality' of any 
reduction in net assets for financial 
assistance purposes mentioned above; 
and
  confirmation by the target's board and 
that of its financial advisers that they 
believe the fee to be in the best 
interests of shareholders. This takes 
the form of a private comfort letter 
from the financial adviser describing 
the background to the negotiations 
leading to the agreement to pay the 
inducement fee and explaining why it 
is thought appropriate to pay a fee if 
there is a potential competing offer. It 
will also contain an opinion on behalf 
of the financial adviser, and board to 
the effect that the fee is fair and 
reasonable and in shareholders' best 
interests.
Contract
Another point which may need to be 
considered is whether particular break 
fee arrangements constitute a penalty and 
are therefore unenforceable. (This is the 
case where a sum is payable on breach of 
contract and exceeds a genuine pre- 
estimate of loss which the innocent party 
would be likely to suffer as a result of 
breach by the other party.) The point is 
not often an issue in the case of break 
fees, because payment of the fee is made 
under an agreement and on the 
happening of certain defined events, 
rather than as a result of breach of 
contract, but may be relevant in the 
context of breach of an exclusivity 
agreement.
Conclusion
Market practice on break fees is 
developing and becoming more 
sophisticated. Payment of break fees by 
shareholders in the target raises further 
issues   also under the Substantial 
Acquisition Rules which form part of the 
Takeover Code   and care needs to be 
exercised to take account of all the legal 
issues which arise in structuring these 
arrangements. (&
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